States Rights, Southern Hypocrisy, and the Crisis of the Union

Paul Finkelman
Albany Law School

(Draft only, not for Publication or Distribution)

On December 20 we marked -- I cannot say celebrated -- the sesquicentennial of South
Carolina's secession. By the end of February, 1861 six other states would follow South Carolina
into the Confederacy. Most scholars fully understand that secession and the war that followed
were rooted in slavery. As Lincoln noted in his second inaugural, as he looked back on four
years of horrible war, in 1861 "One-eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not
distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the southern part of it. These slaves
constituted a peculiar and powerful interest. All knew that this interest was somehow the cause
of the war."1
What Lincoln admitted in 1865, Confederate leaders asserted much earlier. In his
famous "Cornerstone Speech," Alexander Stephens, the Confederate vice president, denounced
the Northern claims (which he incorrectly also attributed to Thomas Jefferson) that the
"enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature; that it was wrong in principle,
socially, morally, and politically." He proudly declared: "Our new government is founded upon
exactly the opposite idea; its foundations are laid, its cornerstone rests, upon the great truth that
the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery subordination to the superior race is his
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natural and normal condition. " Stephens argued that it was "insanity" to believe that "that the
negro is equal" or that slavery was wrong.2
Stephens only echoed South Carolina's declaration that it was leaving the Union because
"A geographical line has been drawn across the Union, and all the States north of that line have
united in the election of a man to the high office of President of the United States, whose
opinions and purposes are hostile to slavery. He is to be entrusted with the administration of the
common Government, because he has declared that that 'Government cannot endure permanently
half slave, half free,' and that the public mind must rest in the belief that slavery is in the course
of ultimate extinction."3 In other words, South Carolina was leaving the Union because the
leaders of that state believed that the incoming Lincoln administration threatened slavery.
Shortly after South Carolina left the Union, Georgia did the same. Beginning with the
second sentence of its Declaration of Secession, Georgia made it clear that slavery was the force
behind secession: "For the last ten years we have had numerous and serious causes of complaint
against our non-slave-holding confederate States with reference to the subject of African slavery.
They have endeavored to weaken our security, to disturb our domestic peace and tranquility, and
persistently refused to comply with their express constitutional obligations to us in reference to
that property, and by the use of their power in the Federal Government have striven to deprive us
of an equal enjoyment of the common Territories of the Republic. This hostile policy of our
confederates has been pursued with every circumstance of aggravation which could arouse the
passions and excite the hatred of our people, and has placed the two sections of the Union for
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many years past in the condition of virtual civil war."4 Mississippi made the point even clearer,
starting with the second sentence of its Declaration: "Our position is thoroughly identified with
the institution of slavery-- the greatest material interest of the world."5
Despite the almost universal understanding of serious scholars that slavery was at the root
of secession and the Civil War -- and the almost endless statements of Confederate leaders on
this point -- a considerable number of American cling to the belief that secession was about
"states' rights," and that southerners left the Union to escape a tyrannical national government
that was trampling on their rights. Advocates of this old fashioned, and simultaneously modern,
neo-Confederate, ideology, rarely discuss the substance of southern states' rights claims, because
they will either lead to an intellectual dead end, or lead back to slavery.

I:
Ironies of the States' Rights Interpretation of Secession

The notion that secession was rooted in states' rights is correct in only one way. The
southern states claimed that they had the "right" to seceded, and that this right was rooted in the
inherent sovereignty of the states. South Carolina noted that the Federal Government's
"encroachments upon the reserved rights of the States, fully justified" the state in "withdrawing
from the Federal Union" and that the "now the State of South Carolina" had "resumed her
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separate and equal place among nations."6 Thus, the right to secession was rooted in a particular
view of states' rights that most of the states of the Union had never accepted.
However, the substantive reasons for secession there not the rights of the states. While
rhetorically South Carolina and other seceding states may have claimed that the national
government had "encroached" on their "reserved rights," none of the seceding states offered any
examples of this, because in fact there were none. Instead, all of their examples -- the reasons
they offered to justify secession -- were about national policy involving slavery in the territories,
the admission of new slave states, John Brown's raid at Harpers Ferry, northern opposition to
slavery; the refusal of northern states to aggressive help in the return of fugitives slaves, and the
other actions by northern state government that were hostile to slavery. Most of these complaints
were not in fact about the national government impinging on southern states' rights, rather they
were demands that the national government ought to impinge on northern states' rights. Thus,
there are in fact, four significant ironies to the states rights issue and secession.
First, because the Constitution of 1787 was deeply protective of slavery, and the Supreme
Court enhanced this protection, there was directly tie to nationalism and slavery. This meant that
before 1861 the slave states did not need to have a states' rights ideology to protect their most
important social and economic institutions. A nationalist position did that for them. Most of the
complaints about the national government and slavery in the secessionist documents were not
about the national government impinging on southern states rights. For example, South Carolina
complained that the northern states were not helping to enforce the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850,
and thus "laws of the General Government have ceased to effect the objects of the Constitution."7
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Second, because the Constitution was proslavery, and supporters of slavery controlled the
national government almost continuously from 1801 until 1861, the most important proponents
of states' rights in the antebellum period were northern opponents of slavery. Northerners need
to assert states' rights in order to protect their free blacks from kidnapping and protect their
fugitive slave neighbors from being returned to bondage. Thus, starting in the 1820s most free
states passed personal liberty laws which frustrated the implementation of the Fugitive Slave
Law of 1793. In the 1830s courts in Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey upheld state
personal liberty laws that undermined the 1793 law and effectively held that the 1793 law was
unconstitutional, in part on states' rights grounds.8 In the early 1840s Governor William H.
Seward of New York and three successive governors of Maine refused to surrender blacks
wanted in the South for helping slaves escape. Just before the Civil War Governors Salmon P.
Chase and William Dennison also refused to surrender a free black who had helped a slave
escape.9 These northern governors rested their actions on states rights arguments.10 Finally,
after the Supreme Court struck down the first wave of northern personal liberty laws, in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania (1842) 11 many northern states responded with new laws, which simply withdrew
all northern cooperation in the return of fugitive slaves.12 This was a variant of states' rights
philosophy. In these laws, passed in the 1840s and more so in the 1850s after the adoption of the
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fugitive slave law of 1850, the northern states took the position that their states did not have to
cooperate with the federal government. In doing so, they made enforcement of the 1850 law
difficult, or in some places, nearly impossible, to implement.
Third, the most aggressive states rights arguments of the antebellum decade came from
northerners, particularly judges in Ohio,13 New York14 and most of all Wisconsin.15 In response
to the Oberlin-Wellington rescue in Ohio, that state's supreme court came within one vote
causing a confrontation with the federal government by issuing a writ of habeas corpus directed
at the U.S. marshal in Cleveland. This Wisconsin Supreme was not so circumspect and in fact
issued a writ of habeas corpus that forced U.S. Marshall Stephen Ableman to surrender the
abolitionist Sherman Booth after he had been arrested for helping rescue a fugitive slave. In New
York, in Lemmon v. The People (1860) the state's highest court rejected any measure of comity
towards visiting southerners. Here the states emancipated eight Virginia slaves who were
brought into the state for just one night, while their owners waited for a steamboat to take them
to New Orleans. They were in the city only because New York was the only east coast port that
had direct transit to New Orleans. The decision in Lemmon was a legitimate within the context
of American constitution law and state police powers. But, southerners believed this decision,
and similar ones in other states, violated the spirit of the Union and the comity that should be
given to citizens of other states. In addition, some southerners believe the decision in Lemmon
actually violated the Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Constitution because it denied southerners the right to travel in their United States with their
constitutionally protected property and it interfered with interstate commerce.
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Finally, while southerners proclaimed their support for states rights, they insisted that
road to states' rights ran in only one direction. They denied that northerners had a right to assert
their states' rights when it came to slavery. Thus for example, South Carolina complained that
the northern states "assume the right of deciding upon the propriety of our domestic institutions;
and have denied the rights of property established in fifteen of the States and recognized by the
Constitution; they have denounced as sinful the institution of slavery; they have permitted open
establishment among them of societies, whose avowed object is to disturb the peace and to
eloign the property of the citizens of other States."16 In other words, South Carolina opposed the
idea that the free states could have their "states' rights" to allow antislavery organizations to
operate. Similarly, South Carolina denounced the Lemmon decision as violation of comity
without any sense of the irony that it was actually opposing states' rights. Significantly, since the
1820s, South Carolina had successfully refused to allow northern free black sailors to enter its
ports. Almost every other southern state with a ocean port passed a similar black seamen's law.
Under these laws free black sailors were jailed while their ships were in southern ports and were
only released when the ship was about to sail, if the ship captain paid the jailer of the feeding and
housing these sailors. Although believing such laws violated the commerce clause, the
supremacy clause, the treaty power, Justice William Johnson, while riding circuit, refused to
interfere with the enforcement of these laws.17 The southern states insisted that states' rights
empowered them to arrest free black sailors (or any other free blacks) entering their jurisdiction.
In the 1840s Massachusetts sent commissioners to South Carolina and Louisiana to negotiate
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some accommodation for free black sailors from the North, but both states refused to meet with
the commissioners, and basically expelled them.18
Ironically then, the southern states argued that states' rights allowed them to decide who
they would let into their states. But, when northerners applied the same logic to visiting
southerners with slaves, South Carolina suddenly rejected its support for states rights, and argued
this was grounds for secession.
II
States' Rights and Fugitive Slaves
The most important states' rights activities of the antebellum period came out of the
northern opposition to the return of fugitive slaves. The Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 provided
almost no protection against kidnapping of free blacks or mistaken seizures of free blacks by
southern slave catchers. The northern personal liberty laws were a states' rights response to this
federal law. They supplemented the federal law by guaranteeing that there would a due process
hearing for fugitive slaves. In Prigg the Supreme Court struck down all these laws on the
grounds that the 1793 law preempted state laws, and that the fugitive slave clause of the
Constitution, gave the national government exclusive jurisdiction in this area. In Prigg Justice
Story held that in absence of a federal law, the states were barred from passing legislation under
the dormant powers of Congress. The Court held that the states ought to help enforce the federal
law, but they would not be required to. In the court's first use of the concept of unfunded
mandates, the Story held that since state officials were not paid by the federal government, they
could not be compelled to enforce or implement a federal law.
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Southerners complained that without state help, it would be impossible to recover
fugitive slaves because there were very few federal officials to aid them. Thus, they demanded a
new and stronger fugitive slave law, which federal enforcement. This resulted in the Fugitive
Slave Law of 1850, which created the first federal law enforcement bureaucracy in American
history. By providing for the appointment of a federal commissioner in every county in the
nation, the 1850 law vastly expanded the reach of the federal government. Southerners wrote
this law and pushed it through Congress. The law had no place for state participation.

At most,

states might provided jail space that federal marshals could use to incarcerate fugitive slaves or
provide back up police to prevent riots that might lead to freeing fugitives from federal custody.
Enforcement was placed entirely in the hands of the federal government. Most of the northern
states responded to this law by simply withdrawing any support for the law. This was
constitutionally permissible under Prigg and did not in any way violate the law of 1850. This
was a moderate states' rights response to a deeply oppressive and unfair federal law.19
In explaining their reasons for secession, southern states complained that the northern
states did not voluntarily cooperate with the return of fugitive slaves. South Carolina asserted
that "The States of Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts,
New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Wisconsin, Michigan and Iowa, by solemn legislative
enactments, have deliberately, directly or indirectly violated the 3rd clause of the 2nd section of
the 4th article of the federal constitution, and laws passed in pursuance thereof; thereby annulling
a material provision of the compact, designed by its framers to perpetuate the amity between the
members of the confederacy and to secure the rights of the slave-holding States in their domestic
institutions-- a provision founded in justice and wisdom, and without the enforcement of which
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the compact fails to accomplish the object of its creation. Some of those States have imposed
high fines and degrading penalties upon any of their citizens or officers who may carry out in
good faith that provision of the compact, or the federal laws enacted in accordance therewith."
This was of course a grotesque overstatement of what the free states had done. Moreover, it was
a complete denial of their states' rights. Under historic notions of states' rights, the states were in
fact free to prohibit their officials from enforcing federal laws. The Supreme Court agreed in
Prigg.
They only "nullification" of the Constitution in the North came from Wisconsin, where
the Supreme Court declared the 1850 law unconstitutional. This was the most extreme northern
states' rights position, and one that no other northern states took. Ohio refused to return a free
black, Willis Lago, to Kentucky where he was charged with theft for helping a slave escape.
But, gubernatorial discretion in the rendition of fugitives from justice was also consistent with
states' rights theory, and the Supreme Court correctly upheld this position in Kentucky v.
Dennison.
Thus, by 1861 the states' rights claims were no longer southern. The South denied the
viability of states' rights arguments and instead moved to a position of demanding northern
fidelity to southern values. Thus, the southern states seceded because Northern states were using
their states' rights to protest slavery, protect abolitionists, and to denounce the injustice of
slaveholding. The South no longer wanted states' rights -- it just wanted its own way. In the
classic move of "my way, or the highway," South Carolina marched down the road of secession
and war.
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